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Abstract 
The tariff imposed over the use of electricity transmission networks is one critical factor to 
achieve efficiency in electricity markets. In Mexico, the current transmission network tariffs 
are based on long run marginal costs. We propose an incentive price-cap mechanism and 
apply it to the meshed network system in the isolated electricity system of Southern Baja 
California, Mexico. We further compare the current transmission tariffs set by the Mexican 
regulator (CRE) with the tariffs resulting from our regulatory scheme. We show that our 
mechanism prices the network at tariffs rendering superior welfare compared to the tariffs 
determined by Mexican authorities. 
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1. Introduction 
One key objective in an electricity market is to achieve economic efficiency in the provision of 
its various services and products.4 However, factors hindering this goal include incomplete 
markets, increasing trade of electricity among control areas, construction of new generating 
capacity that exceeds network capacity of the network, scarce operation and maintenance, 
poorly defined property rights, as well as lack of investment for expanding transmission 
networks. In last years, different authors have deepened into the study of electricity transmission 
expansion. The aim has been to find the optimal determination of network pricing and 
corresponding adequate regulation. This approach has gained importance, both in theory and 
practice, due to the liberalization processes in several electricity systems that prioritize vertical 
separation and unbundling of electricity generation and transmission, together with independent 
system operators (ISOs). The aim has been to create highly competitive electricity markets that 
facilitate timely infrastructure investment. Electricity transmission-network pricing is further 
especially important for generation supply companies to reach optimal efficient supply.  
Mexico is currently opening its electricity industry to private investment in new 
generation and transmission projects so as to provide cheaper and more reliable electricity 
services to consumers.5 This is being carried out through vertically disintegrating generation 
from transmission networks, and through granting an independent role to the system operator, 
CENACE. After the approval of the electricity reform in 2014, transmission tariffs are now 
based on long-run marginal costs through a methodology designed by the Mexican energy 
regulator (CRE). Such a tariff regulatory approach, however, might not generate sufficient 
efficiency incentives for the transmission network owner (CFE) to expand networks.  
 
4 See Hogan (2002) and Hunt (2002). 
5 See Secretaría de Gobernación (2016). 
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The issue of optimal transmission expansion has been analyzed in the economics 
literature through a range of different regulatory schemes and mechanisms, e.g., Léautier (2000), 
Vogelsang (2001), Rosellón (2003), Kristiansen and Rosellón (2006), Rosellón (2007), Tanaka 
(2007), Léautier and Thelen (2009), Rosellón et. al. (2010) and Hogan et al. (2010). Designing 
optimal regulatory mechanisms is difficult given the specific physical characteristics of 
electricity networks like negative local externalities due to loop flows, i.e. electricity flows 
obeying Kirchhoff’s laws.6 One approach to transmission expansion has been traditional central 
planning, either carried within a vertically integrated utility or by a regulatory authority. A usual 
alternative has been cost-of-service regulation. In contrast, transmission decisions could also be 
determined in a decentralized non-regulated way.  
The Hogan-Rosellon-Vogelsang price-cap mechanism (Hogan et al. 2010, HRV) is an 
example of a decentralized regulatory regime which combines merchant and regulatory 
structures to promote the expansion of electricity networks. The HRV incentive mechanism has 
been shown to promote network expansion in a welfare superior way to cost-plus regulation or 
no-regulation in a number of analytical studies, even under realistic demand patterns and large-
scale renewable integration (e.g., Rosellón and Weigt, 2011, Rosellón et al., 2012, Ruiz and 
Rosellón, 2012, Zenón and Rosellón, 2012, Schill et al., 2015, Egerer et al., 2015, Neumann et 
al., 2015). 
In this paper, we propose an incentive price-cap mechanism over the two-part tariffs of 
the transmission company (Transco), which promotes welfare efficient expansion of the 
transmission grid. We apply our mechanism to the isolated network system in Southern Baja 
California, Mexico. We further compare in terms of consumer surplus, by means of simulations, 
 
6 See Schweppe et. al. (1988) 
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the CRE’s tariffs with the tariffs resulting from our model. Our proposed model relies on HRV, 
a model that has also been tested in several real electricity networks, and proved to achieve 
network price convergence to welfare-optimal Ramsey tariffs. Welfare-optimal expansion of 
the Baja Californian grid is addressed in our paper under the new nodal pricing system 
implemented in the Mexican system. 
This document is organized as follows. In first instance, in section 2 we present a brief 
description of the Mexican electricity sector enumerating the activities taking place within the 
industry, summarizing the characteristics of the current infrastructure in the electricity system, 
and pointing out the regulatory regime currently in place for electricity networks. In section 3, 
we present the model for transmission expansion, and we describe the data and sources from the 
Baja Californian system used, the simulations carried out, as well as our main results. In section 
4, we conclude with brief concluding remarks.  
2. The Mexican Electricity Transmission System and Regulated 
Tariffs 
2.1 The Mexican Transmission System and Prodesen 
98.4% of the Mexican population has nowadays access to electricity through a grid of 879.691 
kms. in length owned by CFE (transmission and distribution lines), and an infrastructure of 190 
power plants yielding 41.516 megawatts (MW) in effective capacity. The generation park is 
comprised of 74.1% in fossil fuels (48,530 MW) and 25.9% in clean technologies (16,921 
MW).7 83%8 corresponds to power stations for public service, while the remaining 17% 
 
7 Clean energy technologies in Mexico include hydro and nuclear generation, as well as renewable energy sources 
(solar, wind, geothermal and biomass). 
8 76% of generation capacity for public service corresponds to plants owned by CFE, and the remaining 24% plants 
are owned by Independent Power Producers (IPP's). 
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correspond to power private schemes such as self-supply, cogeneration, small contribution, 
exports, and continuous-own use. 
The national transmission system is composed of 53 regions as shown in Figure 1,9 49 
of which are interconnected and form the Interconnected Electricity System (IES); the 
remaining 4 regions conform a group in the isolated south region of Southern Baja 
California.  The capacity of the connection between transmission regions remains in the range 
of 90MW to 4.000 MW. As of December 2014, the total length of transmission lines with 
voltage between 230-400 kV was 52.815 km, and 58.660 km for voltages of 69 kV. 
Figure 1. National transmission system of Mexico 
 
 
 
 
 
The modernization and expansion of the national electricity infrastructure is one of the 
objectives of Mexican authorities to boost economic development. In the context of the 
electricity reform, the aim is to anticipate the needs of the national electricity demand and supply 
growth through substantially expanding the national transmission system, including a future 
interconnection of the IES with the isolated network system in Southern Baja California.  
According to the national transmission planning system, PRODESEN, the IES is expected to 
 
9 Regions Ixtepec (40), Güémez (21) and Loreto (53) were incorporated into the national electricity system in 2015. 
Fuente: SENER 
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develop in such a way during coming years so that marginal prices in most areas of the country 
will become more uniform (see Figure 2).10 
PRODESEN is actually carried out through a complex planning system, including a 
power-flow model to determine specific transmission-line expansion projects. Line expansion 
are determined using as input the forecast on future growth of generation plants throughout the 
country annually made by the energy ministry (SENER), Transmission expansion then follows 
generation growth in the logic of the PRODESEN’s planning process. For 2015-2029, it is 
estimated that 24.599 kms. of new network capacity need to be built (see Appendix 1)11.  
Figure 2. Nodal pricing system’s projection for 2020 
 
 
2.2 Regulated Electricity-Transmission Tariffs 
CRE has recently determined a set of regulated transmission tariffs the period January 1st, 2016 
through December 31st, 2018.12 The information submitted to CRE by the CFE was analyzed taking 
 
10 The IES has been meshed in the voltage level of 400 kV in the center, east, northeast and west of the country. In 
the north, northwest and peninsular areas, the IES is in stage of strengthening, with transmission networks in some 
isolated links evolving from 230 kV to 400 kV. See SENER (2015) 
11 Appendix 2 presents the corresponding transmission expansion data for Southern Baja California. 
12 See CRE (2016a, 2016b, 2016c) 
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into account information of its audited financial statements, costs reported, the relevance of the cost-
allocation model, as well as projections on demand and supply. The determination of regulated 
transmission tariffs consisted of two sequential steps. In a first step, the required income authorized to 
CFE for providing the electricity-transmission service is determined (adjusted with an efficiency 
factor). In a second step, the required income is allocated with tariffs to the different types of consumers. 
The formulas for each step are as follows: 
First step 
RI = C + OMA - X 
where 
RI: Required Income 
C: Return on capital and depreciation 
OMA: Operating, maintenance and administration costs 13 
X: Adjustment factor for efficiency improvements in operating OMA costs for 2017 
and 2018 14 
The RI for 2017 and 2018 will also be subject to the X-efficiency factor, as well as to 
inflation, exchange-rate and PRODESEN-investment factors. Table 1 below shows the RIs for 
2016-2018 calculated by the CRE. 
 
 
 
 
13 OMA considers both historical and projected operating costs reported by CFE. 
14 An annual 1% X-efficiency factor was determined for 2017 and 2018. 
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Table 1. CFE´s required incomes for 2016-2017 (source: CRE) 
 
Second step 
Since users of the national transmission network are generators, suppliers and qualified users, 
revenue allocation authorized to CFE is set proportionally to these types of consumers: 70% to 
consumers and 30% to generators. The design of charges is performed through a particular form 
of "postage stamp" based on injections or withdrawals of energy that each generator, supplier 
or qualified user make from the network. Weights are also assigned based on tension levels, so 
as to reflect the capacity long-run marginal costs (see Table 2). There are two voltage ranges: 
higher or equal to 220 kV, and below 220 kV. Marginal costs to develop these two types of 
networks are different, and there are consumers that that make use of both tension levels. 
Table 2. Weighting factors for different voltage levels (source: CRE) 
 
Based on the above weighting factors and the allocation of CFE’s transmission income, 
generation and load tariffs are calculated according to: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 70% 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 
𝑇𝑇g𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 30% 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎg𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎg𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹g𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 
where: 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: tariff for consumer i connected in tension level j. 
• 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅: annual net required income  
• 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: weighting factor for voltage level i to which demand d is connected 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: energy extraction of user i 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗: energy demand of resting consumers k. 
• 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: tariff for generator i connected in voltage level j. 
• 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: weighting factor for voltage level i to which generation g is connected. 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗: energy injection of generator i 
• 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗: total generation injected into the grid for resting generators k. 
 
In accordance with projected demand, CRE has determined transmission tariffs for 2016 as 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Electricity transmission tariffs in Mexico (source: CRE) 
 
Notes:  
1. Tariffs for generators apply to all generators participating in the wholesale electricity market, and to energy 
injections in the first point of interconnection of the national territory associated with imports. 
2. Tariffs for consumers apply to all qualified users who are market participants, retailers, and marketers who purchase 
energy in the wholesale electricity market, and energy extractions in the last point of connection of the national 
territory associated with country exports. 
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At the end of a tariff period, a reconciliation of the required income authorized to CFE will 
be made. Income in excess or less than the authorized income will be transferred to the next 
tariff period. In addition, tariffs are updated annually by applying, in the corresponding year, an 
inflation-production-price adjustment factor and the average daily exchange rates15  observed 
during the year for which the adjustment is being made. For these adjustments, it is assumed 
that total CFE’s costs are affected 10% by exchange-rate variation 90% by domestic inflation. 
3. The Model, Data, Simulations and Results 
3.1 The Model 
Our model is based on the two-level programming model in Hogan et al. (2010). More 
specifically, we use the “capacity setting” version of this model16 that enables the Transco to 
choose its network capacity and its fixed fees, while maximizing its flow of profits when 
expanding the network.17 For the reader’s convenience, we make in the Appendix a transcription 
of this model. 
This mechanism is applied to the Baja Californian transmission system assuming linear 
inter-node transmission cost-functions, expanding cost values, a linear demand with a price–
elasticity value of at each reference node, and a depreciation factor. A price cap is then set over 
the transmission two-part tariff weighted by previous period Laspeyres weights. Hourly results 
obtain as outcomes. 
 
15 Based on the exchange rate to settle liabilities denominated in dollars E.U, payable in Mexico published in the 
Official Gazette, by Bank of Mexico. 
16 See Hogan et al. (2010), section 6.2.3. 
17 The original choice variables in the HRV model are incremental financial transmission rights FTRs (variable 
part) and the fixed part of the transmission two-part tariff (Hogan et al., section 6.2.1). For implementation 
purposes, this original reformulation can be reduced in terms of the congestion rent collected by the ISO, given 
market clearing prices (FTRs stand for financial transmission rights, a financial instrument used in electricity 
markets to hedge consumers from nodal-price instruments. FTRs are also important to grant property rights in the 
expansion of transmission networks. See Joskow an Tirole, 2000, and Kristiansen and Rosellón, 2006, 2010. FTRs 
can also have important redistributive effects in recently created markets. See Kunz et. al., 2014).  
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3.2 Data 
Data collected and used in this work correspond to the isolated electricity system of Southern 
Baja California, as shown in Figure 3. All existing lines in this system have levels less than or 
equal to 230 kV . Figure 3 also depict existing generation plants.  
Figure 3. Isolated system of Southern Baja California (Source: Own elaboration) 
 
3.3 Simulations and Results18 
Two scenario analysis are analyzed: 
1. The first one addresses the three nodes appearing in Figure 1 for Southern Baja 
California. 
 
18 The following simulations assume uniform congestion levels across transmission lines. 
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2. The second scenario case considers a disaggregation of these 3 nodes, taking into 
account an actual detailed infrastructure of 31 nodes (substations) contained in the 
isolated system. 
Table 4 presents sources for the data required to run the HRV model for the two scenarios. 
Table 4. Data and sources 
LOWER-LEVEL AND UPPER-LEVEL MODELS 
DATA SOURCE 
Existing network, disaggregation of nodes: 
Case 1: 3 nodes 
Case 2: 31 nodes 
 
SENER-PRODESEN (2014-2015) 
CENACE (2014-2015) 
DEMAND NODE I / DEMAND NODE I PER HOUR FOR 
BOTH CASES 
SENER-PRODESEN (2014-2015) 
CENACE (2014-2015) 
Generation of node i / generation node i by hour and type of technology SENER-PRODESEN (2014-2015) 
CENACE (2014-2015) 
Generation costs by type of technology, for both cases. 
CFE (2012) 
MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF LINES, REACTANCE, 
LENGTH, ETC., FOR BOTH CASES 
SENER-PRODESEN (2014-2015) 
CENACE (2014-2015) 
REGULATED TARIFFS19 CRE (2016) 
Contrast data as support for verification of results 
SENER-PRODESEN (2014-2015) 
 
3.3.1 Simulation Method 
Simulations for the Southern Baja California system were implemented as an MPEC problem in 
the GAMS software.20 Simulations are performed continuously over 10 periods. A congested 
network is assumed at the beginning of the simulation. The mechanism starts by solving the 
lower-level power-flow problem. Once this problem sheds feasible solutions for dispatch, 
 
19 As shown in Table 3. 
20 Mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is a mathematical technique related to the 
Stackelberg games used to study constrained optimization problems subject to various types of constraints 
(e.g.,variational inequalities or complementarities). The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) is a 
modeling system for mathematical optimization that solves linear, nonlinear, and mixed-integer optimization 
problems. 
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losses, energy flows and nodal prices, the profit maximization upper-level problem of the 
Transco subject to the incentive regulatory constraint is solved, using as inputs the results of the 
lower-level problem. A linear demand is assumed at each node.21  
3.3.2 Case 1: 3 Nodes 
This first case analyzes a network of three nodes, represented in Figure 4. These data are taken 
from information in aggregated form. Simulations run over 10 periods and results are illustrated 
in Figure 5. 
Figure 4. Map Transmission regions of Baja California Sur (Source: Own elaboration) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison of results of the HRV mechanism for periods 1 and 10 
 (Source: Own elaboration) 
 
21 The linear demand function is a standard assumption in the applied literature of incentive regulation for electricity 
transmission. See for instance, Rosellón and Weigt (2011). 
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As shown in Figure 5, there is initially a congested transmission line. This line connects the 
transmission node of Villa Constitución with the node La Paz. Therefore, under this analysis, 
the Transco invests in such a congested line, increasing in transmission capacity. So as to 
counterbalance the loss in congestion rents, the Transco raises its fixed tariff relative to the 
variable part. Figure 6 shows these rebalancing over 10 periods. Capacity investments in the 
transmission network allow convergence of prices in all nodes to a single variable price.  
Figure 6. Rebalancing fixed and variable tariffs for 3 nodes  
 
Villa Constitución 
Fixed tariff 
La paz 
Los cabos 
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3.3.3 Case 2: 31 Nodes 
This case addresses data in a network with 31 nodes and 39 transmission lines as shown in 
Figure 7. Here, we count with more detailed information on the network; thus can be observed 
specific areas with congestion and thus make investments in specific lines that require it. 
Simulations over 10 periods were conducted with the following results:  
 
Figure 7. Detailed nodal network system of Southern Baja California  
(Source: Own elaboration) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 8, there are initially various congested transmission lines. Red highlights 
the most congested lines, while green the least congested lines. It may also be observed that 
there exist lines that display no congestion. Figure 8 also shows another map with the realized 
investments after the various simulation periods22. This analysis permits to observe capacity 
 
22 Investment is shown in percentage relative to the initial capacity in the starting lines. 
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increases of congested lines over time. Again, the implied losses in congestion rents are 
compensated with increases in the Transco’s fixed tariff. Another important result obtained is 
shown in Figure 9.  As expected, there is a convergence in the nodal price to a marginal uniform 
price at the end of the simulation prices.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Congested network of Southern Baja California Sur and line investments over 11 
periods (Source: Own elaboration) 
 
Figure 9. Convergence of nodal prices to a marginal uniform price  
(Source: Own elaboration) 
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As before, our model allows a convergence to marginal prices based on capacity investments 
on the network. The investment process is characterized by the rebalancing of the fixed and the 
variable tariffs, as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Rebalancing of fixed and variable tariffs for the 31-node case 
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In our analysis, price zones are divided into 6 zones. Three of these areas represent the areas 
mentioned in case 1, and the other three areas represent the interconnections between the zones 
in Los Cabos, La Paz and Villa Constitución. Results lump together the prices in these 6 zones. 
We compute a transmission tariff for each of the periods of the simulation which allows the 
Transco to have the necessary incentives to invest in network expansion. This tariff is calculated 
by taking into account the fixed tariff resulting from our model as well as congestion rents. 
Additionally, we apply weights in the same way as the CRE’s mechanism. That is, 70% is 
considered a charge to consumers, and 30% to generators. Tables 5 and 6 below indicate the 
results obtained for generators and consumers, respectively, when our calculated tariff (HRV) 
is compared to the CRE’s one. We take the demand projected by the SENER for the next 10 
years. The expected payoff for consumers with both tariffs is calculated. The savings or excess 
expenditure for consumers under our proposed HRV scheme is also obtained.  
 
Table 5. Comparison of electricity transmission tariffs for generators. 
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION TARIFFS FOR GENERATORS ($ / MWh) 
PERIOD 
VOLTAGE <220  KV23 DEMAND*  
MWH 
PAYMENT OF GENERATORS 
HRV SAVINGS 
HRV CRE HRV CRE 
1 66.19 90.40 486.50 32,202.56 43,979.60 11,777.04 
2 80.01 93.65 511.28 40,907.07 47,883.19 6,976.12 
3 91.38 97.03 541.65 49,494.88 52,553.85 3,058.96 
4 98.88 100.52 571.15 56,475.86 57,410.87 935.01 
5 103.65 104.14 602.41 62,439.76 62,733.93 294.17 
6 106.72 107.89 639.69 68,264.76 69,013.88 749.13 
7 109.78 111.77 680.13 74,661.26 76,017.97 1,356.72 
8 112.89 115.79 724.51 81,792.94 83,893.99 2,101.06 
9 116.04 119.96 773.11 89,713.57 92,744.26 3,030.69 
10 123.40 124.28 821.54 101,375.99 102,102.49 726.50 
11 134.57 128.76 877.68 118,113.07 113,005.72 -5,107.34 
* Demand forecast for southern Baja California (provided by SENER) 
 
23 The analysis is performed only for lower voltages to 220 Kv given the data. As the BCS System 2015 had only 
2 lines of 230 Kv and the remaining 37 lines with a lower voltage. 
 19 
  
 
Table 6. Comparison of electricity transmission tariffs for consumers. 
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION FOR CONSUMERS ($ / MWh) 
PERIOD 
VOLTAGE <220  KV DEMAND*  
MWH 
PAYMENT OF GENERATORS 
HRV SAVINGS 
HRV CRE HRV CRE 
1 85.14 142.40 486.50 41,418.55 69,277.60 27,859.05 
2 105.14 147.53 511.28 53,757.08 75,426.62 21,669.55 
3 121.93 152.84 541.65 66,043.10 82,783.94 16,740.84 
4 133.68 158.34 571.15 76,348.30 90,434.83 14,086.53 
5 141.83 164.04 602.41 85,441.76 98,819.82 13,378.06 
6 147.73 169.95 639.69 94,501.17 108,712.13 14,210.96 
7 153.55 176.06 680.13 104,431.83 119,745.12 15,313.30 
8 159.37 182.40 724.51 115,464.53 132,151.60 16,687.07 
9 165.16 188.97 773.11 127,684.58 146,092.72 18,408.14 
10 176.28 195.77 821.54 144,822.85 160,834.01 16,011.16 
11 192.25 202.82 877.68 168,732.95 178,009.02 9,276.07 
* Demand forecast for southern Baja California (provided by SENER) 
 
Results then show that consumers’ spending is less under our model. Figure 11 illustrates 
this. 
Figure 11. HRV tariffs vs. CRE tariffs for generators and consumers  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 shows a lower tariff implied by our incentive model than that calculated by the 
CRE for both network users. It can also be noted that in the case of generators the tariff 
difference is not very significant. However, in the case of consumers the difference is quite large 
Generators     Consumers 
Saving with 
HR
 
Saving with HRV
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over all periods. This could indicate that the tariff being charged to consumers by the CRE is 
non-optimal.  
4. Conclusions 
This paper carried out the application of a hybrid merchant-regulatory mechanism so as to obtain 
transmission welfare-maximizing tariffs for the Southern Baja Californian electricity system. 
We further compared our obtained tariffs with the corresponding ones used by the Mexican 
regulator, CRE, to set the CFE’s transmission prices. The CRE actually obtains these tariffs 
through a two-stage process. In the first stage, the CFE’s required income is determined based 
on operation and maintenance costs, adjusted by efficiency and inflation factors. In the second 
stage, a weight is established depending on the tension level at which a network link is being 
used. This permits to reflect the long-run marginal costs of developing transmission links. Two 
types of tariffs are then obtained for each tension level. One for generators and another one for 
consumers. We showed that this CRE’s mechanism does not result in welfare efficient pricing 
and, additionally, does not provide invectives to expand the network efficiently. 
In contrast, our model proposes an incentive price-cap regulation regime over the CFE’s 
Transco within a competitive nodal-price electricity market that is operated by an ISO 
(CENACE). Our price-cap formula really establishes a limit on the Transco’s two-part tariff, 
relying on Laspeyres weights, and incents the expansion of the transmission grid through the 
rebalancing of the fixed and variable parts of the tariff. This process gradually diminishes 
congestion rents but the Transco is able to compensate the loss in such rents by increasing the 
fixed-part of the tariff, a process that inter-temporally eventually leads to convergence to a 
welfare optimal steady state. The transition to such state is also carried out in a way that both 
consumer and producer surpluses increase over time. 
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The comparison of our tariffs with the CRE’s tariffs for Southern Baja California was done 
under two cases on nodal structure, using real data from CENACE. In a first aggregated case, 
we assumed a three-node market. In the second disaggregated case, a more detailed thirty-one 
node structure was modelled. The second case, of course, allows for more detailed results on 
planned capacity-increase for each transmission line in the system. In both cases, our regulated 
tariffs align better than the CRE’s tariffs regarding investment incentives to efficiently expand 
transmission links as well as on eventually converging to optimal social welfare. 
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6. Appendixes 
6.1 Appendix 1: New Network Capacity for Southern Baja 
California (2015-2029)  
7.1  
 
INVESTMENT IN COMPENSATION FOR 
VOLTAGE LEVEL 2015-2029 (IN MILLION 
PESOS) 
Año 400 
KV 
230 
KV 
161-69 KV TOT
AL 
2015 224 267 241 733 
2016 608 117 195 919 
2017 1,145 8 317 1,469 
2018 422 19 444 885 
2019 268 67 395 730 
2020 184 62 242 488 
2021 160 0 89 249 
2022 32 0 131 163 
2023 41 4 196 241 
2024 443 15 169 627 
2025 615 21 75 710 
2026 121 0 29 150 
2027 152 0 16 167 
Total 4,612 579 2,597 7,787 
SOURCE: CENACE. 
INVESTMENT IN TRANSMISSION for 
VOLTAGE LEVEL 2015-2029. (IN MILLION 
PESOS ) 
year 400 KV 230 KV 161-69 
KV 
TOTAL 
2015 2,101 422 1,753 4,276 
2016 4,492 1,453 1,035 6,980 
2017 4,138 1,293 2,662 8,093 
2018 2,324 975 2,675 5,974 
2019 3,833 882 2,559 7,274 
2020 2,035 1,092 1,144 4,271 
2021 919 754 1,058 2,731 
2022 434 1,088 843 2,365 
2023 508 904 528 1,940 
2024 8,076 707 750 9,534 
2025 7,690 570 627 8,887 
2026 1,513 225 194 1,931 
2027 466 520 87 1,073 
2028 354 306 119 778 
2029 777 350 133 1,261 
Total 39,660 11,541 16,167 67,368 
SOURCE: CENACE. 
INVESTMENT IN TRANSFORMATION BY 
VOLTAGE LEVEL 2015-2029 (IN MILLION 
PESOS) 
Año 400 KV 230 KV 161-69 
KV 
TOTAL 
2015 1,286 1,726 4,239 7,251 
2016 1,953 1,374 3,062 6,389 
2017 2,561 2,523 3,195 8,279 
2018 1,021 1,743 3,359 6,123 
2019 1,017 1,417 3,989 6,423 
2020 1,263 1,535 2,852 5,650 
2021 589 1,230 1,818 3,637 
2022 1,177 1,315 1,295 3,787 
2023 945 1,036 982 2,963 
2024 1,413 1,075 1,297 3,785 
2025 1,586 669 1,173 3,428 
2026 797 286 702 1,785 
2027 495 386 159 1,040 
2028 529 342 191 1,063 
2029 607 338 351 1,296 
Total 17,239 16,995 28,664 62,899 
SOURCE: CENACE. 
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6.2 Appendix 2: Transmission Expansion Data for Southern 
Baja California 
 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS AND INDICATORS, 2015-2024, SOUTHERN BAJA CALIFORNIA 
CONCEPT Unit Capacity 
TRANSMISSION 
Projects 16 
km-c 416.9 
TRANSFORMATION 
Projects 9 
Capacity 
MVA 
810.0 
COMPENSATION 
Projects 10 
Capacity 
MVA 
115.0 
SOURCE: CENACE. 
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MAJOR SCHEDULED TRANSFORMATION PROJECTS, 2015-2024, SOUTHERN BAJA CALIFORNIA 
substation QUANTITY EQUIPMENT CAPACITY 
MVA 
TRANSFORMATION 
RELATION 
ENTRY 
DATE 
Cabo Falso Banco 1 1 T 30 115/13.8 Jun-15 
Monte Real Banco 1 1 T 30 115/13.8 ABR-16 
Camino Real Banco 1 1 T 30 115/13.8 Abr-16 
Pozo de Cota Banco 1 4 AT 300 230/115 ABR-18 
Palmira Banco 2 1 T 30 115/13.8 Jun-19 
Aeropuerto Los Cabos Banco 1 1 T 30 115/13.8 JUN-20 
Monte Real Banco 2 1 T 30 115/13.8 Jun-20 
Libramiento San José Banco 1 4 AT 300 230/115 ABR-21 
Cabo Falso Banco 2 1 T 30 115/13.8 Jun-21 
Total 
  
810 
  
AT. Autotransformer  T. Transformer. 
SOURCE: CENACE 
 
MAJOR SCHEDULED COMPENSATION PROJECTS, 2015-2024, SOUTHERN BAJA CALIFORNIA 
COMPENSATION EQUIPMENT VOLTAGE KV CAPACITY MVAR ENTRY DATE 
Bledales MVAr Capacitor 115 12.5 Oct-17 
Santiago MVAr CAPACITOR 115 7.5 OCT-17 
Cabo Real MVAr Capacitor 115 7.5 Abr-19 
Palmilla MVAr CAPACITOR 115 7.5 ABR-19 
San José del Cabo MVAr Capacitor 115 15 Abr-19 
Villa Constitución MVAr CAPACITOR 115 7.5 ABR-19 
Monte Real MVAr Capacitor 115 12.5 Abr-19 
Insurgentes MVAr CAPACITOR 115 7.5 ABR-19 
Loreto MVAr Capacitor 115 7.5 Abr-19 
El Palmar MVAr CAPACITOR 115 30 ABR-20 
Total 
  
115 
 
PRODESEN 2015 
SOURCE: CENACE. 
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6.3 Appendix 3: The HRV Model 
The transmission two-part tariff is capped with a price cap (adjusted by rpi-inflation and x-
efficiency factors) defined by the regulator. In general terms, the expansion of the network 
occurs in a such a way that congestion is reduced. This of course might have an initial effect 
of reducing the Transco’s profits due to the reduction of congestion revenues. However, the 
Transco overcomes such a decline in congestion revenues by intertemporally rebalancing the 
two parts of its tariff, mainly increasing the fixed part. The sequence of actions in our model 
are described as follows: 
• There is an existing network in an electricity market under a nodal-pricing design, and 
real power flows. 
• There is a single Transco, which has a natural monopoly in the transmission network, 
and thus decides on the extension of the network.  
• There is information on historical market prices. This information is used by the 
regulator to set a price-cap restriction over transmission two-part tariffs. 
• Based on available market information on demand, generation supply, and network 
topology, the transco identifies which lines should be expanded. 
• The iso manages generation dispatch maximizing welfare --collecting bids from 
generators and loads at each node-- and it calculates nodal prices. According to 
marginal nodal prices, the iso gathers payments from suppliers and pay generators. 
The difference between the two values represents the congestion rent of the system. 
• The non-myopic Transco intertemporally maximizes profits according to the price-
cap restriction on its two-part tariffs, rebalancing the variable and fixed parts of its 
tariff, and guided by the evolution in congestion rents. 
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• The choice variables are line capacity k, and the fixed tariff f. 
Our model then consists of a sequence of two problems: an upper-level problem and a 
lower-level problem that are solved simultaneously. The upper-level problem consists of the 
maximization of profits by the Transco, subject to the price-cap regulatory constraint. The 
lower level problem is the ISO’s power-flow optimal dispatch model in the wholesale market, 
which maximizes the social welfare. 
We next present the upper-level and lower-level components of our model. The definition 
of variables is as follows:  
 
Upper-level problem 
The Transco’s objective is given in terms of congestion rents as: 
𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒌𝒌,𝑭𝑭 𝝅𝝅 = ∑ �∑ 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 − 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊�����������𝑨𝑨′ + 𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕�𝑩𝑩 − ∑ 𝒄𝒄(𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 )���𝑪𝑪𝒊𝒊,𝒊𝒊 �𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊                                                                      (1) 
Subject to  
ij
tk = line capacity between node i and node j at time t. 
tF  = fixed fee at time t. 
t
i
d  = demand at node i at time t. 
t
ig  = generation at node i at time t. 
gBiPB
max
 = available generation capacity. 
tN  = number of consumers at time t. 
p(.)  = demand function. 
c(k) = transmission cost function in terms of capacity. 
RPI = inflation adjustment factor 
X = efficiency adjustment factor  
w = weight 
mcBiB = marginal generation costs at node i. 
 
pfBijB = power flow on the line connecting i and j 
 
qBiB = net injections 
 30 
  
∑ �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒘𝒘−𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒘𝒘�+𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊∑ �𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒘𝒘−𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒘𝒘�+𝑭𝑭𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊��� �����������𝑫𝑫′ ≤ 𝟏𝟏 + 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹+ 𝑿𝑿���������𝑬𝑬                                                               (𝟐𝟐)  
 In (1), congestion rent A’ depends on nodal-price differences between loads and 
generators: 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊 − 𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊. Term B denotes revenues from fixed charges, while term C 
represents the expanding transmission cost function. (2) represents the RPI-X weighted price-
cap constraint (E) over the transmission two-part tariff (D’).  
Lower-level problem 
An ISO maximizes social welfare W given restrictions on generation capacity, transmission-
line capacity, and energy balance. It also makes sure that all electricity-engineering technical 
restrictions are met in a market with linear demand and constant generation marginal cost at 
each period t. The welfare maximizing problem for the ISO then looks like: 
𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒅𝒅,𝒈𝒈 𝑾𝑾 = �(� 𝒑𝒑(𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊𝟎𝟎𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 )d𝒅𝒅 𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒊) −�𝒎𝒎𝒄𝒄𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕                                                                         (𝟑𝟑) 
subject to 
𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 ≤ 𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 ∀𝒊𝒊, 𝒕𝒕                                                                                                                           (𝟒𝟒) �𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 � ≤ 𝒌𝒌𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕  ∀𝒊𝒊, 𝒊𝒊                                                                                                                                  (𝟓𝟓)  𝒈𝒈𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 + 𝒒𝒒𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 = 𝒅𝒅𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕                                                                                                                                 (𝟔𝟔) 
Restriction (4) means that generation g at each node i cannot be greater than a 
predetermined maximum generation capacity
maxg . Equation (5) shows that energy flow ijpf  
in a transmission link between nodes i and j may not exceed transmission-line limit ijk . Last 
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restriction (6) indicates that load at each local node is to be satisfied by generation supply at 
such a node, or from power imports from other nodes.  
We follow the approach of an economic dispatch within a meshed dc-network topology. 
The Transco maximizes profits at each time t relying on the welfare-optimal solution derived 
from the ISO’s economic dispatch program. Numerical iterations in the lower-level problem 
provide the optimal values of demand d, generation g and nodal prices p at each node i, which 
in turn feed up the upper-level program so as to determine the values of capacity k, and the 
corresponding fixed charge f (see figure 12).  
Figure 12 
 
               SOURCE: OWN ELABORATION. 
 
 
